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NATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ORDER*
By

LINDEN

A.

MANDER

The thesis of the present paper is that the future of law in this
country is dependent upon the solution of the problem of international
security and that without this solution we must expect to see a progressive decline in the rule of law and a probably unlimited growth
at an increasingly rapid rate of official discretionary power with all
the dangers to national liberty which such a development would entail.
The problem springs from the effect of total war which itself has
derived from the application of technological discoveries to war upon
an anarchical world society, i. e., a world society lacking in adequate
organs of government.
Most national constitutions were drawn up on the assumption that
the life of the people of a nation could proceed in security, free from
overwhelming danger. The Constitution of the United States, for example, was formed at a time when the major problems requiring
detailed constitutional treatment were internal; the conduct of external
affairs, both in the diplomatic and the military sphere was left very
largely to the executive, with the exception that Congress was designated to be the instrumentality for the declaration of war. The traditional discretion left to the executive in foreign relations was rightly
justified on the ground that this agency had access to fuller information
by reason of its control over the diplomatic service and was able, when
emergency demanded, to take rapid decision. The assumption underlying the whole constitutional structure was that, although war might
constitute an occasional danger, and although constant vigilance was
necessary to protect national interests, the major part of national
existence was assured. It was possible at one and the same time to
provide an adequate defense and to have left over sufficient energy
and wealth for national welfare and development. (It is true that
constitutional lawyers expounded at length on questions which at one
time seemed largely theoretical as to how far treaties and executive
emergency war powers could in practice modify the normal distribution of powers and individual rights set forth in the Constitution.)
That period has ended for the impact of modem war has altered the
whole problem of domestic constitutionalism, as the following pages
should make clear.
In recent years two outstanding developments in our American
domestic law have taken place, first, the growth in power of the federal
government relative to state and local governments and second, the
* A paper read before the Legal Institute of the Seattle Bar Association,
April 7, 1944.
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growth of what is popularly called administrative law or, if one prefers, the administrative process. Many of these developments in. both
fields can be traced to the complexity of modem economic and social
life due to the progressively widening impact and influence of modem
industry. What is equally important to emphasize, however, is that
much of the movement toward centralization and administrative discretion within nations arises from the spread of international anarchy,
by which I mean the situation created in the modem world by a combination of international interdependence and the lack of international
agencies to control and channelize the vast energies which modern
science has released in an interdependent world.
More specifically, the growth of total war has meant the progressive
subordination of economic and social life to the one all-dominating
purpose of preserving national existence. In the present struggle for
survival many legal safeguards of individual liberty which formerly
could be permitted on the assumption that the nation was still essentially safe have had to go overboard. Economic liberties have had to be
sacrificed (economics in uniform describes the position of industry in
war time) and anyone can think of many instances in which private
and corporate injustices have been suffered by reason of the hurried
and desperate character of total national organization set-up to avoid
total national defeat. What many people fail to see is that government
regulation springs from two sources, that due to what might have been
normal social and economic complexity and that due to ever-widening
military emergency. The same holds true of centralization. Thus we
see that the center of gravity of modern nations has changed, and that
in addition to threats to legal safeguards arising within nations, there
are also threats from without. The lawlessness among nations expressed
in the doctrine of national sovereignty (and sovereignty implies the
lack of any legal control over the sovereign nation and thus is a doctrine of international anarchy), has increased, and it is, I thi~ik, significant that the decline in international law has been paralleled by a
growth of personal rule and administrative discretion within the nations
themselves. International rules dealing with neutrality, respect for
diplomats, treatment of prisoners, treatment of private property, etc.,
have been ruthlessly discarded; indeed modern war has made neutrality
well nigh impossible because powers engaged in total .war tend no
longer to recognize any distinction between contraband and non-contraband, and neutrality rights therefore must progressively diminish as
the area and intensity of war expand. The neutral state therefore
must give up a great deal of its international rights or fight for them,
and in preparing to defend its rights must arm to the teeth, and in
doing so relax the individual liberties and safeguards which are luxuries
that can be afforded only when the existence of the nation is clearly
unimperilled.
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Is there anything abnormal in the decline in respect for international
law combined with the mounting tide of personal and administrative
government within nations? I think not. The decline of international
law measures the growing sense of international insecurity. Governments strike quickly, they rush to grab raw materials, and bring
pressure upon neutrals, since they must gain time in an age of blitzkrieg
when the initial blow may be well-nigh decisive. They cannot observe
the restraint of acknowledged rules. This deterioration in external
relations must be paralleled by crisis measures within national boundaries, where every effort must be made to insure the safety of the
state which principle then becomes the highest law. Nations feel that
they can no longer afford fully to observe either international or
domestic law. The dictator countries could more readily arm by first
destroying their national constitutions; the democratic countries must
organize accordingly.
Who in the present war can separate the necessary arbitrariness
of governments for urgent military reasons from the type of executive
arbitrariness against which Anglo-Saxon countries have fought for
centuries and against which they have erected the careful legal procedures known especially to and valued by the legal profession? If
today an objection is raised against some official action, the reply is
made that the action is dictated by military necessity. If people suspect that there has been unjustified encroachment or inefficiency in
one of the government services they find it difficult to obtain full information because the government will say that the publication of information will be of more value to the enemy that it will be to its own
democracy. Who shall judge whether this explanation is true? Thus
democracy runs the risk of a progressively diminishing control over
its officials: for uncontrolled power is alleged to be necessary to wage
war, but uncontrolled power is very difficult to reconcile with the
institutions of law which have been so carefully built up over the
centuries. One may fairly conclude therefore that in the conduct of
the present war lie many dangers to free institutions and that certain
bureaucratic top-heaviness and habits may well persist, and that if
the growing impact of international affairs upon national affairs continues in a war world we may expect to see an expanding area of of ficial discretion under cover of military necessity or reasons of state. If
we are to reverse this tendency we must constitutionalize what has
traditionally been called foreign relations, otherwise the constitutionalism of domestic life will be swallowed up in the crisis government
resulting from international instability.
The reason is not difficult to find. Unless the problem of international security receives a more adequate solution than it did twenty
years ago we shall probably not have an opportunity of resuming many
of the safeguards of national law. If we repeat the spectacle of 1919
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by -defeating our enemies and as a set of victorious allies begin an
armaments race among ourselves such a race will from the outset involve total armed preparations, including a -huge industrial establishment devoted to the preparation of the industrial products necessary
for modem technological war, agricultural organizationf and psychological preparation by means of propaganda and indoctrination. We
know something now of fifth column methods and in the light of
this knowledge we shall be worried as to whether a person advocating
low armaments is secretly subsidized by a foreign government or
whether he genuinely believes that the -future of democracy will require a reduction of armament expenditures. One will 'not be able to
decide whether the critic of the government is a loyal critic or a disloyal one, whether his purpose is to remedy abuses within the government or to discredit the government in the eyes of its own people. I
-need not cite instances in view of the scores of illustrations afforded
during the last ten years. Free and open discussion which constitutes
the very lifeblood of the reign of law will be dangerously imperilled.
We may examine the future prospects of law from another angle,
namely the position of the President of the United States. He is one
and the same time the executive head of the nation, the commanderin-chief' of the armed forces and the head of his political party. It is
submitted that under present conditions of total war it is becoming
increasingly difficult for the President to combine these three functions
satisfactorily. We remember the outcry against the Office of War
Information on the ground that it was using the President's position-as
commander-in-chief in such a way as to load the scales in favor of the
political party of which the President was head. The truth or untruth
of the accusation does not concern us here; what is important to appreciate is that if the world has to face a period of indefinite and deepening crisis, the task of unscrambling the President's position of a threefold leadership and disentangling the party, executive, and war aspects
of that position will be well-nigh impossible.
We already see the effect of war upon the tenure of office of the
President. The second term may very properly be defended from the
point of view of the crisis; and possibly the third term; but now
comes talk of a fourth term, and that may not be the end. Suppose
that after the shooting is over the political condition of the world
remains ominous, the President of the United States, whoever he might
be, would be able to appeal to the danger of swapping horses amid
stream. But one cannot ignore the danger that if the stream of international crisis grows wide enough there may be no changing of horses!
Is it fantastic to believe that in this way a continuous international
crisis might pave the way to a one-party system? I think not. For as
hinted above,.now that fifth column methods have become the normal
procedure in undermining popular confidence, the political party
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system could be made a spearhead of a preliminary underground attack upon democracy. Already before this war, serious charges were
being made by so-called interventionists and non-interventionists alike;
suspicion of motives was growing apace; and even now a number of
books are appearing which name important people as being tied to
non-democratic organizations. Those familiar with the recent history
of Europe have no need to be reminded how the party processes can
ultimately be destroyed provided that the internal crisis grows serious
enough, and in every case, I think, the national crises in Europe proved
to be most intimately connected with the international crisis both of
Europe and of the world.
One should not assume that the picture given above will necessarily
work out within the next year or two for under the American system
Congress has periodically revolted against the Executive. As several
writers have pointed out, the separation of powers has tended to
result in an alternation of powers and the pendulum has swung with
sufficient regularity in the past to justify one in raising the question
whether the present congressional revolt against the Executive may
not be symptomatic of a significant process in American history. Many
measures have been passed by Congress in the last year or so to check
the Executive and the administration. With the rightness or wrongness of the action of Congress, we are not here concerned, but one
should not overlook the danger that the revolt against the Executive
may come at a time when important national decisions relating to
foreign policy have to be reached. If Congress, which has traditionally
reflected sectional and local interests more than the national interest
as a whole, should fall prey to members who in their balanced or excessive zeal against executive and administrative measures may vote
blindly or mostly under the influence of particular group interests the
catastrophe for this country might assume gigantic proportions. For in
the confusion and bitterness the United States might well weaken itself
through a renewed dissension over international matters and foreign
policy (as in 1919 and 1920) and out of the confusion might well
come a deteroriation in the position of this country in world affairs.
In that case the internal political pendulum would swing again, because the intensity of the international crisis would necessarily lead to
a renewed executive control, whatever the party complexion of that
executive might be. And it is not difficult to predict that after another
period of heightened executive power coinciding with an intensified
international crisis (and even war) totalitarian tendencies here would
definitely increase. Thus the present Congressional revolt, which perhaps in some matters at least, fails to distinguish between the international causes and the domestic causes of the growth of executive
power may have, unless the members develop and maintain a wide
vision, disastrous consequences. My point is that in an age of inter-
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national crisis it is proving to be, and will continue to be, more difficult to hold the balance between the legislature and the executive under
our traditional form of government. This form of government is not
primarily suited to a condition of continuing crisis; unless there is a
relatively large amount of elbow room, as it were, misunderstanding
and friction and inefficiency will result; and war and continued crisis
do not permit the "elbow room" to exist.
I wonder if many people appreciate how organization for total war
has affected the civil rights of citizens; and yet surely the evidence
before us needs no elaboration. The American-born Japanese citizens
of the West Coast, many of them loyal beyond question, have been
compulsorily shifted from their homes, have suffered economic loss,
and face the prospect that, owing to the growth of race prejudice, they
may not be permitted to resume their normal life on the West Coast
again. We may indeed have created a second class of American citizenship. No one, I think, would deny the military factors involved in
shifting the population (though whether the move was undertaken primarily to prevent sabotage or primarily to protect the Japanese themselves may be here left open to question). What has happened to the
American Japanese may happen to others, for owing to the ingenious
and multifarious methods now possible in total war, every person
belonging to a minority group may be a potential enemy and thus those
with "double loyalties" may find themselves in a tragic and impossible
position. The unfavorable position of our American-born Japanese
citizens is directly traceable to the war and so also is the growing tension between negroes and whites. The unduly rapid and extensive
movement of population in this country due to war necessities has
resulted in tearing up people from their accustomed modes of life, and
the race riots in Detroit and New York and the tensions in Seattle
bear eloquent witness to the dangers to our internal social structure
which are resulting from the strain of war. Is it not a fair judgment
that the mounting anti-Semitism, deplorable though it is, springs in
large measure from the crisis in world affairs, and is connected with
resistance to further Jewish immigration which receives new impetus
from the Nazi persecutions in Europe and from heightened emotions in
wartime? Evidence exists that a similar and undesirable state of mind
threatens to poison the relations between American-born Mexican citizens and other citizens of this country.
The United States comprises one of the most imposing collections
of minorities under one government in the history of human kind,
but the position of minorities in their civil, cultural, religious, and legal
relations tends to become worse because of the need of taking no
chances in an age of war and the consequent redoubled surveillance
over such minorities. Stern action toward and persecution of minorities, however, seriously affected the spiritual and political unity of
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many a country and produced disastrous results as the history of
Austria-Hungary and of Turkey has dearly shown. One may conclude,
then, that the reign of law is threatened by modern war, not only
in the undue growth of the administrative process and the tendency
of the Executive and Congress to be increasingly at loggerheads but
also by reason of the threat to the very civil rights which it is the
function of law to protect.
Nor can the lawyer be indifferent to the alarming growth of crime
and the breakdown of traditional restraits which make the enforcement
of law within this country a matter of increasing difficulty. The evidence seems clear that the over-rapid social changes required to wage
total war are more destructive of traditional restraints than would be a
change in international organizations for the purpose of preventing
war. At present the evils resulting from bad housing conditions, the
moral breakdown due to congestion and the opportunities for exploitation, etc., are immediately felt; the rather remote changes in governmental structure (remote from the average citizen's daily experience)
would not touch so immediately his everyday conduct. Many people
argue that to effect a change from national sovereignty to international
organization would involve vast changes in human behavior. That may
be true, but it is submitted that these changes would be on the periphery, as it were, of the individual's private life. True, many symbolic
changes ultimately would be necessary, but recent history shows how
painlessly much international organization has grown up to meet social
needs. The International Postal Union functions in a way which does
not infringe upon the consciousness of the average citizens of the member countries. So with the International Copyright Union, the League of
Nations Health Organization, etc. Why should we assume that a future
amount of international control would unduly disrupt the life of national citizens? It may indeed be hoped that such international control will lessen some of the multifarious federal interferences of today.
for many of these interferences have grown out of the necessity of organizing for total war while the amount of international organization
required in the event of establishing a genuine United Nations would
necessitate far less control over the daily life of citizens. Paradoxical
as it may appear, the liberties of the average person and his freedom
from excessive regulation would be more guaranteed by a wider framework of world government than under a number of competing national
governments each striving to organize itself as completely as possible
for total defense or offense as the case might be. What has happened
today has been a catastrophic disruption of the element of routine in
social life and that disruption must continue unless we can replace
competitive armaments with a reasonable degree of cooperation enabling people to get back to a greater degree of leisure and normal
living. Can we expect that people's extended efforts can be maintained
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for many years more, and can we hope that the restraints necessary
for the observance of law can long coexist with the growing nervous
tensions which are evident throughout the modem world?
Indeed, no student of law can be blind to the relation between the
observance of law and the amount of energy manifested in national
life. Weariness of body and soul is a poor foundation on which to
build a vital respect for law. Unless there is an elert and active public
determined to support the law, statutes will be disregarded and enforcement become lax. Institutions do not perpetuate themselves without the continuing love of and respect for law and a widespread faith
in essential justice. The growth of indifference for whatever reason
means the shrinkage in the area of effective lawand this is a dangerous
phenomenon. Unless concern for justice and law maintains itself at
constant pitch, and unless men remain sensitive to the fate of nations
as well as of individuals, they tend first to become exclusively national
in their sympathies, and then indifferent to the general interests of
even their own nation. Hence we have seen that indifference to the
plight of minorities abroad has preceded the development of racial intolerance at home. A national isolationism in matters of justice soon
leads to regionalism and even personalism in what concerns the rights
and liberties of men.
Indifference can arise from over-complexity, and total war, by
leading to an immense growth of complexity in modem society, leads
also to uncertainty and bewilderment concerning rules and regulations.
Today thousands of laymen as well as lawyers are puzzled because of
the contradictory nature of many official pronouncements; these contradictory official pronouncements spring in part from the very urgency
of policies to be framed and jobs to be done. But if the evil is carried
too far a general skepticism results in which the baby is thrown out
with the bath. At first respect will be maintained for the outer form
of laws but the inner spring of enthusiasm will have declined; what
once manifested itself as an eager devotion to principle develops into
a laborious observance of appearances, and later even the effort to maintain appearances falters. A tired people cannot have a vital enthusiasm
for law and modern civilization stands in grave danger of becoming
over-wearied through excessive strain because of international strife
and anarchy which in turn affects national morale.
Under these circumstances those less sensitive to the general spirit
of the time, those maladjusted people of ocer-weening ambition or of
crude fundamentalist fanaticism have their chance. Their energies are
not dissipated by doubts; they see all too clearly the goal set before
them in their over-simple vision. It may be the elemental cry of social
justice or the appeal to a super-race or merely an exuberant outburst
of violence. A tired civilization invites attack from the energetic and
ruthless; Madelin has well .said that the French Revolution can be
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traced to the energy of the lower classes which overthrew the enervated
aristocracy. Today we run the same risk, for along with weariness
and skepticism which are widely prevalent has come the practice of
violence which the last generation has witnessed in intensified form.
Almost twenty years ago Professor Bonn in discussing the crisis of
European democracy pointed out that parliamentary institutions in
the new governments of Europe had to meet the great threat of millions
of men returning from the front where they had seen for years all
types of horror and destruction. How could these millions settle down
to the parliamentary process of settling differences by discussion?
Bonn's analysis holds true with even greater force today for, as a recent
writer has said, millions of men have tasted the strong meat of
violence. And it should be obvious that nations cannot go all out in
armed struggle, cannot indulge in hate and propaganda without becoming infected by the very evils which they strive to overcome. Consequently, at the end of the present international hostilities, we may
expect to find tempers shorter and willingness to compromise lessened.
An historian writing on Byzantium uttered a profound truth when
he traced the bitterness of internal politics in Constantinople to the
excessive strain placed upon the eastern Roman Empire by centuries
of defense against the Arabs and Turks. And we may well anticipate.
however much we may deplore, increased political bitterness within
this country at the end of the war. If such proves to be the case, the
task of national law will be rendered that much more difficult.
An essential element of law consists in the power to make rules
that are essential to welfare. Up to now most people have assumed that
the sovereign state has the power to make rules for its own peace, happiness, and good government, but such is no longer the case. The foundations of modern world society have broadened so much that the
sovereign state no longer has control over many essential conditions
which determine its welfare. A few examples will suffice to make the
point. Disease has become an international problem. And a great deal
of international cooperation has developed out of sheer necessity in
order to prevent the introduction of such scourges as typhus, yellow
fever, and sleeping sickness into the several countries; germs are no
respecters of sovereignty. So in the prevention of crime. The battle
against dangerous drugs has had necessarily to be fought by nations
combining their forces against ingenious smugglers who could escape
through loopholes which separate national policies permitted to remain.
And whatever be the legal theory the practical fact remains that in
order to protect industrial and artistic property in an age of extensive
international trade nations have had to act together.
It is unnecessary at this point to add further illustrations. The general principle which emerges is that national interest and welfare and
national sovereignty no longer are synonymous terms. But to hold to a
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legal theory which says one thing and to live in a world which embodies another thing involves serious danger, for unless theory and
practice are brought into close relation nations may sacrifice their
welfare to out-worn theory or engage in practice unilluminated by an
accurate appraisal of the principles involved.
If forces which vitally affect the welfare of a nation can and do
originate outside the boundaries of that nation, it follows that the distinction between internal and external affairs becomes less true and
perhaps even artificial. We now see that the treatment of racial and
national minorities in Germany by the Nazis had world-wide consequences; neglect of health precautions in one country may threaten
another country with a ruinous epidemic; and civil dissension abroad
may form the prelude to international strife as indeed the Spanish
civil war formed a prelude to World War II. The depression- in the
United States had repercussions throughout the world, the collapse of
the Credit Anstalt in Austria in 1931 set in motion forces which led
to the collapse of international currency stability, and national tariffs
have had serious effects upon even far distant lands. In the light of
these considerations it becomes obvious that' some international agencies are necessary for a systematic consideration of matters which
originate in one country and affect the welfare of other countries. If
these things are to be dealt with in an orderly way they will require
the collaboration of nations; what touches all will be a matter of active
concern to all. Thus it would appear that the great task which confronts the modem world is one of constitution building, of ascertaining which agencies can best fulfill the task of effective government. If
the reign of law is to extend to these new problems some division of
powers will be essential. Some matters will best be regulated by international action, others by national action and still others by state and
local action. This does not mean that the divisions at the outset will be
hard and fast, for obviously much experimentation will have to be attempted before the world will be in a position to see clearly the best
lines of division. Indeed, one may venture the opinion that just as in
the United States the simple division of federal and state powers has
given away to a much more complicated federal system involving
over-lapping of federal, state, and local jurisdictions, so in the world
which lies ahead we may expect to find a similar complicated and overlapping pattern of international governmental structure. Nor should this
be surprising since the problems to be solved in the modem world are
bewilderingly complex.
Our analysis should make clear the fallacy involved in the argument
that a nation had better first solve its domestic problems and then
turn to international problems. The sharp division between internal
and external exists only in the minds of some people; it does not correspond to fact. Moreover, historically, many reforms have begun
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in the international sphere and have come down, as it were, to the
national level. When the League of Nations attacked the opium problem it found that its activities were limited by the lack of national
agencies of inquiry and enforcement, and before international organization could make much headway against the opium menace it had to persuade national governments to set up appropriate national institutions.
Similarly in labor legislation; not a little national and local attempts
to improve labor conditions foundered upon the rock of international
competition by low-paid labor. Wisconsin's desire to prohibit the manufacture of matches made of white phosphorus had to wait for its fulfillment until an international convention dealing with this problem
had been signed. Indeed, within the last twenty years international
"legislation" on labor matters has outstripped national achievement
and we have the spectacle of standards internationally determined
which go beyond what many countries have been able thus far to
reach. Many relatively backward countries have owed a good deal to
the stimulus and example given through association in international
bodies with more advanced countries and as modern life becomes more
complex no country can afford to ignore the experience of other countries. International institutions which can bring together this experience can further the national self-interest of the member states.
If rules are to be systematically developed to channelize the productive energy of mankind and to limit the evils resulting from uncoordinated activities or from anti-social action, institutions for making and
enforcing and interpreting these rules will be and indeed have become
a necessity from the point of view of national self-interest which has
now become so entangled with international organization that the two
things cannot be kept separate. International organization thus appears, not as an alternative to national well-being but as one of its essential conditions; only with adequate international organizations can
we hope for the survival within nations of the rule of law considered
both as an instrument for preventing crime and disorder and for
promoting justice and social welfare.
It follows that those interested in maintaining and strengthening the
rule of law within nations cannot be indifferent to the condition of
international law. Elsewhere I have attempted to summarize its weaknesses under the following headings:
1. Scholars disagree as to the nature of international law whether it
was true law or not.
2. Some argue that treaties are the expression of the will of a sovereign state while others claim that they are legal obligations. If.
however, treaties are "sacred" it must be obvious that nations cannot
be unlimited in their sovereignty; if they are unlimited in their sovereignty treaties are merely expression of their temporary convenience.
Until the world has made up its mind and ceases to flounder in con-
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fusion of thought on this question, we may expert to see a continuance
of international anarchy. Talk of auto-limitation and the like merely
obscures the problem. Law either is or is not to be observed.
3. International law has recognized the validity of treaties imposed
by force and although war can only be ended by a treaty of peace as
long as this doctrine holds, i. e., of giving a punitive treaty the effect
of law, we are doing little more than legalizing the doctrine "might is
right." It will be difficult to escape from the condition into which
the world has fallen, for obviously we must start somewhere on the
basis of past decisions made as a result of war. If, however, the world
can establish a genuine United Nations and make real the doctrine of
non-recognition of territorial and other changes made by force, international law will have more closely approximated national law which
does not recognize contracts made under duress.
4. Many doctrines in international law have, as Dean Dickinson
points out, "outlived their reason;" such rules include the three-mile
limit (in some respects), immunity of foreign states from suits in national tribunals, the right of nations to use the high seas unhindered,
etc.
5. Another limitation is seen in the question of the so-called justiciable and non-justiciable disputes.
6. Authorities disagree as to how serious are the problems raised by
conflicting legal systems throughout the world, a problem which need
not be analyzed here.
7. Inadequate institutions for the making of law constitute a serious
problem; international conventions have had what some claim to be a
quasi or indirect legislative power. But even here the tendency has
been for the rule of unanimity to act as an obstacle, although in recent
years several exceptions to this rule have been admitted.
8. And above all, the inability of international society to preserve
the peace upon which law necessarily rests was its most grave weakness.
It would appear, therefore, that if world society is to survive, "International law must either go forward very much or be quite discredited.
It cannot remain in its present position containing as it does so many
contradictions." These contradictions must be resolved, and new requirements must be met.
"Chief of the new requirements will be the maintainance of order
without which all other rules rest upon foundations of sand. The new international authority must have sufficient power, as does the United
States government within its borders, to guarantee peace and order.
"But this political power must be used in accordance with rules which
can be legitimately described as rules of law. The new international
society, if it is to be a genuine society, will have an international law
which will closely approximate constitutional law. The constitutions of
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the respective states must be geared to the constitution of the larger
regional and world unit, so that an infraction of international law or
what will be transnational law will at the same time be an infraction of
both national law and the new society's fundamental law."'
To the present writer these conditions appear to be the minimum
necessary in the international world to guarantee the maintenance of
the reign of law within national states.
ILIDEN A. MANDER, FouNDATIoNs
University Press, 1941, pp. 637-639.
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